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Abstract

In population–environment systems human activity is inherently part of the
system rather than something to be minimized in order to maintain or restore “natural” environmental conditions. Issues arising in managing such systems are discussed
in this paper. Three preliminary sets of problems are first dealt with. The system’s
boundaries must be identified, defining its human participants and its ecological
content. Procedures for monitoring demographic and environmental change in the
system must be set up. And consensus must be reached on how to evaluate that
change. Each of these tasks calls for technical knowledge of demographic and ecological relationships (and assessment of uncertainties); in addition each has important political and administrative dimensions. Unclear or contested boundaries, large
numbers of participants, complex system dynamics and outcome indicators, and
unequal stakes by participants complicate the management task. Among the general
problems of designing governing institutions for large and complex population–environment systems are devising compensation arrangements to remedy major asymmetries in returns to participants, enforcing compliance to agreed access rules, and
building in adaptability to changing knowledge and circumstances.

This material may not be reproduced without written permission from the author.

Human intervention in the Earth’s natural (ecological and physical) systems brings
with it problems of management—both of the intervention and, more fundamentally, of
the system. The main exception, aside from interventions that are essentially trivial as a
matter of relative scale, occurs where the effects of an intervention are unrecognized or
unvalued, and hence elicit no feedback response from the intervenors or from others
who are affected. In such a case negative outcomes on both sides may ensue: ecological
degradation on the one hand, adverse repercussions on human wellbeing on the other.
Human prehistory and much of human agrarian history, far from demonstrating a uniform harmony with the natural environment or being a steady course of environmental
transformation to yield improved human welfare, probably witnessed many of these
deteriorating but nonmanaged population–environment relationships. For example,
hunter-gatherers, making up minuscule populations, may have transformed whole ecologies by exterminating top predators or introducing new fire regimes.1 In a later period,
agrarian settlement brought new human diseases, likely acquired from domesticated
animals and rendered endemic by the new living conditions, imposing a worsened demographic regime. Increasingly, however, the form and scale of environmental interventions are nontrivial and have effects that are recognized or can be anticipated. Management issues then come to the fore and must be dealt with.
Those issues can be simply categorized. First is that of delimiting the boundaries
of a population–environment system—not in any cut-and-dried fashion, since the interactions are ramified, play out over long periods, and may be poorly understood, but in a
way that takes into account both scientific knowledge (and uncertainty) and political
and administrative circumstances. Second is the task of monitoring population and environmental change in particular systems, where again both scientific and political/administrative factors necessarily enter. And third is the problem of how to evaluate environmental and demographic change. These issues are treated in the next three sections
of this paper. I then draw on that discussion to consider some general problems (equity,
compliance, and adaptability) met with in the design of governing institutions for population–environment systems.
D ELIMITING P OPULATION –E NVIRONMENT S YSTEMS
Vaclav Smil (2000), in the course of rejecting “willingness to pay” as a satisfactory measure of environmental services, concedes the utility of that measure for “nar-

rowly defined, immediate and short-term concerns on a local or regional level, or when
dealing with crises or catastrophes on a larger scale” (p. 9). These are just the kinds of
population and environment (P–E) systems where boundaries are moderately easy to
discern and defend. For example, the centuries-old common-pool resource (CPR) regimes discussed by Ostrom (1990), which have maintained the ecological stability and
productivity of fragile local environments in the face of pressures of grazing or irrigation demand, apply to clearly prescribed areas and participants. Or again, pollution from
the runoff of agricultural chemicals that affect local fisheries presents a set of relationships fairly readily defined and regionally circumscribed. And as a third case, the realization that release of chlorofluorocarbon gases had a destructive effect on atmospheric
ozone allowed the delimitation of a human-cum-natural system theretofore unrecognized—one that was global in extent but very narrow in content. By contrast, many P–E
systems that enter casual discussion and even the technical literature have notably hazy
boundaries. That is the case, for example, of the systems implicit in the estimates by
Vitousek et al. (1997) of the extent of human domination of the planet. The indicators of
such impact include the proportion of the Earth’s land surface “transformed by human
activity,” the anthropogenic share of atmospheric carbon dioxide, and the proportion of
marine fisheries that are fully exploited or depleted.
The boundaries we need to be concerned with are those that delimit the natural
system and the relevant human population(s).
Physical boundaries
The relevant physical boundaries for a P–E system are not decreed by nature.
Their choice entails judgments of how closely system autonomy needs to be approached—
that is, which spillovers can be ignored or dealt with in other ways and which should be
contained within the system. And they require assessment of management feasibility:
ecologically defined limits may or may not describe a manageable system. Making ecological and administrative boundaries coincide by setting up an ad hoc administrative
authority that spans the ecologically defined domain can be a major initial step in combating P–E degradation. Seriously endangered ecologies often result from failures on
this score, at least in a proximate sense.2 Emergent institutional arrangements by which
individuals threatened by environmental overexploitation devise measures to collec-
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tively limit demand on the system make sense only to the extent that the relevant resource is effectively spanned by those arrangements.
Physical boundaries may be set in such a way as to preserve a section of some particular environment—say, a biodiversity “hot spot” or an area of wetlands—or to protect a
particular species. Typically, a conservation or wilderness area would be defined legislatively, but in a way intended to bind future generations. The idea is to remove such environments from being subject to market-based tradeoffs and (further) political compromises,
even if the initial delimitation was itself a political decision. More generally, for any environmental domain there is likely to be a variety of interest groups with conflicting stakes in
where the boundaries of a P–E system are set: indeed, deciding on boundaries may be the
issue on which the principal political struggles take place.
Cultural factors have a part in setting a system’s physical boundaries—privileging certain animal species, for instance. Such rationales, perhaps scientifically arbitrary,
may yield powerful defenses of system boundaries.3 But dispensing with hard ecology
also carries risks. One recent writer on this subject, noting, in postmodernist fashion,
that humans “construct” their landscapes, goes on to say: “If so, we can hardly say that
there are any boundaries, or even limits to the numbers of possible ‘worlds’, except,
perhaps, those handed down to us or reconstructed by us. And even those boundaries,
reified as they are, are constantly shifting, as we change our individual and collective
identities, and as our identities are changed for us” (Lipschutz 1996: 254). This is the
route to policy immobility.
Social boundaries
What is the population in a P–E system? In common usage, it is those who trample
the plants or hunt the wildlife—the P of IPAT, to use the well-known Ehrlich–Holdren
formula. But that casual association of people and impact cannot bear much scrutiny. As
a step toward greater precision, we might identify three populations involved in a specified system, conceptually distinct although often substantially overlapping (and, as a
theoretical possibility, fully coinciding):
P1: the persons whose actions directly impinge on the environmental component
of the system—the Ehrlichian P;
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P2: the population benefiting from that intervention, and probably countenancing it; presumably P2 ⊃ P1;
P3: the population harmed or at increased risk of harm by any resulting environmental change.
The three may not be well-defined populations in simple demographic terms,
since responsibility, benefit, and harm are not dichotomous factors; each population
would usually be a fuzzy set. But it is convenient to assume non-fuzziness. P2 and P3
together (that is, P2 ∪ P3) are the stakeholders in the system.
In a “tragedy of the commons” the three populations coincide. The farmers pumping irrigation water from an aquifer at an unsustainable rate without the means of enforcing conservation measures on their fellows have no incentive to limit their own use
of water. The costs of deepening their wells as the water table falls, and eventually of
facing the exhaustion of groundwater supply, fall on all the users—equally so, in the
stylized version of the tragedy. (If the time to exhaustion is long enough, however, the
cost is transferred to a future generation, notionally separating out P3.)
In less-stylized P–E systems, P3 is likely to be partly displaced. One group or
community receives net benefits, another has to bear net costs. Upstream agricultural or
settlement activities lead to larger and more frequent downstream floods—and with the
numbers of those affected (P3) swollen by risky settlement on floodplains. For purposes
of P–E management, the system boundaries may or may not include that downstream
environment and its population.4
In another familiar instance, a forest concession may be clear-felled to yield immediate returns to well-connected operators, leaving a severely degraded ecosystem
that is of little value to those who formerly harvested forest products and that represents
an effective enclosure and destruction of part of the country’s natural capital. The same
ecological outcome can also follow from aspiring settlers’ or agroindustrialists’ burning
forest land for expansion of smallholder or plantation agriculture—the likely origin of
the massive forest fires that have been experienced in recent years in Southeast Asia.
Both sources of deforestation are found in major tropical forests such as those of
Kalimantan or the Amazon. The loss of natural capital is borne in some sense by the
national population; in the case of the Indonesian forest fires, at least short-run costs
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were borne widely across the economies and populations of Southeast Asia. The P–E
system for management purposes, however, is probably best delimited by provincial or
national boundaries.
There are of course P–E systems whose social boundaries are necessarily global
in extent—where P3, if not P2, is the world population. Problems of atmospheric ozone
depletion and greenhouse warming are prominent examples, but responses to many other
environmental problems are being sought through cooperation or treaty commitment at
the global level.
Trade and technology transfers and other interactions spread economic development and diffuse costs, blurring distinctions between P2 and P3. The concept of an
“ecological footprint” introduced by Wackernagel and Rees (1996) can be seen as an
effort to unbundle those costs and reattribute them. The footprint of a given population
at a specified standard of living is the equivalent area that can provide the resources and
waste assimilation needed to sustain those numbers at that living standard.5 By and
large, industrialized countries incur an ecological deficit in this sense: they draw on
resource and environmental services well in excess of what can be supplied within their
own borders. As Rees (1996: 110) puts it, “[I]n purely ecological terms, modern settlements have become the human equivalent of cattle feedlots.” (Balancing the ecological
books in this way, however, takes no account of the most obvious “surplus” of those
same countries: the positive externalities flowing from their technological advances.)
In any real set of circumstances precision on population boundaries is probably
unattainable. Much of social life is concerned with transfers of benefits and costs of
human activity, whether through the market or through other kinds of relationship. There
are gradations of benefits and harms over the population, not even necessarily commensurable. Assignment of those experiencing such effects to a particular subgroup, or as
being external to the system, is often an arbitrary decision, and sometimes a contested one.
Intangible or subjective benefits and harms are a further complication. Extinction
of a species or a more general loss of biodiversity may have scant economic repercussions but still cause dismay or regret over a wide population, often in distant countries—
plausibly larger numbers than would be located through a willingness-to-pay inquiry.
(See Smil [2000] for a discussion of this issue.)
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M ONITORING P OPULATION AND E NVIRONMENTAL C HANGE
In environmental systems the monitoring problem consists first in assessing overall
change in the system—that is, in its state variables—and second in assessing the human
contribution to that change. By implication, this human contribution is generally taken
to be damaging, so that the smaller the intervention—the smaller the I of IPAT—the
better. In P–E systems, in contrast, humans are inherently part of the system, not (or not
necessarily) despoiling interlopers. They add one or more elements to the vector of state
variables. For these systems we discard the notion of a pristine, human-free natural
world as the standard from which to measure change. In its place is an interactive system in which human exploitation of environmental resources is the norm. The monitoring problem consists in gauging changes in indicators of quantity (such as forested area)
and quality (such as level of biodiversity) on the environmental side and changes in
human numbers and wellbeing on the population side.
Environmental change, it may be supposed, is easy to assess. The rate of deforestation, for example, is ascertainable by aerial photography or satellite imaging. Yet ambiguities may remain, at the very least calling for careful “ground-truthing.” Thus the
standard, environmental-system view of deforestation in West Africa is of expanding
human agricultural settlements at the expense of primary forest, with drastic reductions
of forest area routinely cited in support, whereas a recent study (Leach and Fairhead
2000) suggests that such a picture is erroneous in every particular. Human-caused deforestation, this study finds, is grossly exaggerated in both international agency statistics
and popular understanding.6 As another example, estimates of the area burned in the
1997 forest fires in Indonesia, all based on remote-sensing data, range over an order of
magnitude, from 100,000 ha. to 1.7 million ha. (Harwell 2000: 308–309).
P–E system management also calls for monitoring the human component, both
numbers and wellbeing. Measurement of population change is conceptually straightforward, but the monitoring task is to separate out the change that is relevant to the system.
Migration, for example, may be a routine process in a more-or-less sustainable P–E
system, with no connection to degradation. This would often be true of circular labor
migration, shifting cultivation, and transhumance. Rural–urban migration is another process that need have little to do with environmental degradation.7 The principal situation
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in which environmental change induces an “exit” strategy is in the case of so-called
environmental refugees—persons displaced by long-term overexploitation of resources
or by sudden natural disaster.
Even where degradation is clearly occurring, human responsibility for it may be
exaggerated. To many observers, for instance, the serious ecological degradation seen in
the Himalayas—alpine soil erosion and landslides—is linked to ill-advised land-use
practices by subsistence hill farmers. Ives and Messerli (1989), however, argue that
natural geophysical processes are probably several orders of magnitude more important
than human interventions. They believe hill farmers contribute little to downstream siltation and flooding—the processes that over the centuries, and long before the era of
rapid population growth, created the fertile plains of northern India and Bangladesh.
Assessing changes in human wellbeing is the other P-monitoring task, drawing
on standard methods of measuring income, poverty, health, mortality, and perhaps other
dimensions of welfare. One component of welfare is derived directly from exploitation
of environmental resources through activities that have to be rationed to a sustainable
level. This may call for detailed monitoring of those activities. Cultural or aesthetic
appreciation of the natural (or built) environment also contributes to welfare.
In most P–E systems of concern to us, there is a lot more going on than is evident
to most participants. We sometimes do not know enough about the system to be certain
of what we should be monitoring. For example, despite the large research effort on the
greenhouse problem, many uncertainties surround the workings of carbon sinks. Again,
in some of the world’s major river basins where agricultural land has been degraded
through over-irrigation and resulting salination, the salt-system dynamics are only now
being understood. It is found that the period between, say, a significant extension of
irrigated land and establishment of a new system equilibrium may be measured in decades: irrespective of what remedial action is taken, the monitoring effort for a lengthy
time will track an environmental decline.8
The monitoring task is not purely technical. Since there are potential winners and
losers in a P–E system, inescapable political issues are involved in any monitoring regime—to do with who monitors and with checks on accuracy and controls on cheating.
These are taken up in the discussion of compliance below.
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V ALUATION I SSUES
Beneath its political and administrative complexities, management of a P–E system is formally a control problem. The system, characterized by its state and control
variables, evolves over time according to more-or-less known dynamics. We seek a time
trajectory of control variables to meet some objective criterion—which in turn is a function of the state and control variables. A proper specification of that function has to
assign values to those variables. In theory, that would mean setting tradeoffs or rates of
substitution among changes in human numbers, health, and economic status, and in
relevant environmental indexes: ethically an all-but-impossible task. In real-world systems of any complexity, no such explicit specification is attempted; incommensurables
are left as they are. But inescapably, judgments that roughly correspond to assumptions
about those tradeoffs are nonetheless being made. Some of the issues raised in these
judgments are described briefly below.
Precaution and regret
The precautionary principle, a mainstay of environmentalist thinking, argues for
taking early action to safeguard against later regret even in advance of full knowledge of
systemic relationships.9 It cannot tell us how much to pay to lessen uncertainty—where
even the probability distribution of an event is unknown. This is sometimes referred to
as the “planner’s dilemma”: how to choose a cutoff point when confronted with an
increasing cost to prepare for an increasingly unlikely but possibly catastrophic event or
trend (see Darmstadter and Toman 1993).
In complex systems like the Earth’s carbon cycle, managerial participants (in this
case, states) have varying degrees of risk aversion, different time-discount rates, different damage functions, and different propensities to free-ride on others’ remedial action.
Add to this varying political appreciations of scientific knowledge about the system’s
dynamics, and there is scant likelihood of consensus on governance. The intricacy and
duration of the debates surrounding the Kyoto Protocol, thus far involving mainly the
developed countries, are entirely predictable.
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Present-time bias?
P–E systems exist over time. They have some expected duration, if not an exact
end point, well short of the life of the Earth itself. A future ice age will likely again cover
large parts of the land surface in an ice sheet. In the nearer term, climate change within
the next century is predicted to transform the species composition of many local ecosystems. Mounting uncertainties about environmental and demographic conditions far ahead
help to justify a degree of present-time bias in our outlook.
Specification of a time-discount rate is in one sense a boundary-setting device—
an alternative to specifying a terminal point for the system, a time beyond which its state
is disregarded.10 But it is also necessarily a valuation issue. At a 3 percent per year
discount rate, a particular environmental impact a generation hence is deemed to be
equivalent to around half the same impact occurring now. “Constitutional” provision for
ecosystem conservation—setting boundaries and prohibitions that it is intended should
never be abridged—are effectively imposing a zero discount rate. Planning of P–E systems concerned with high-level nuclear waste disposal, at least in the United States,
assumes a virtually zero discount rate, with containment chambers required to last many
millennia—although how much of this is insincere accommodation of populist sentiment is hard to gauge. An implied discount rate that would not trivialize environmental
matters a mere lifetime away could not be greater than 1 or 2 percent per year.
Time-discounting is deemed inadmissible by some analysts. Shue (1999) investigates the rights of future generations in resource and environmental policy, both property rights and the fundamental and nonmarketable right of physical security. Such rights,
he asserts, should not be attenuated by discounting (“which values everything from one’s
own point of view exclusively”), let alone by application of a net present-value criterion. (“Whatever may be the correct approach, simply maximizing the net present value
is certainly not it.”) He comes down to a stance that might be described as ethical
sustainability: “we are prohibited from engaging in any practices that will make it impossible for people in the future to enjoy their basic rights when, but for our choosing to
engage in those practices rather than other practices open to us, they could have enjoyed
their basic rights too” (p. 49).
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An alternative means of ethical assessment is the Rawlsian device of a veil of
ignorance applied intertemporally, with the notional persons behind the veil required to
decide on environmental policy without knowing which generation they will be part of.
(This procedure is akin to the philosophical assumption of “tenselessness”: people yet
to be born—but who will be born—are laid out as simultaneous claimants on environmental resources.) The result is likely to favor a strong conservationist ethic.
Adaptive preferences
Over real time, in contrast to that tenseless world, people’s tastes and values
change. “Wilderness,” for example, was once a feared environment, a region awaiting
the civilizing influence of human settlement, not an object of protective concern.11 Aesthetic valuations evolve and change with social and economic development, as more
basic consumption needs are satisfied and as leisure time expands.
Tastes and values also adjust to environmental actualities. We are acculturated to
our environments and in some measure change along with them. Over long time periods, especially with generational turnover, people adapt to new environmental conditions and regret ebbs or vanishes. Present-day European populations, ever willing to
demonstrate strong support for reducing tropical deforestation, do not pine for the temperate forests of the Dark Ages, let alone work to reestablish them—although some
natural reforestation is occurring as a byproduct of agricultural and demographic change.
Indeed, it is the human-transformed agrarian landscapes of field and hedgerow that are
often deemed in need of preservation.
Human and environmental ethics
In valuing human wellbeing how do we account for changes in population numbers? Congestion effects detract from a person’s enjoyment of an environmental amenity, but more people are able to share the experience: is there a gain in overall human
welfare? If the people are already nearby, waiting at the gates, and if the detraction is not
too large, the answer may well be yes—though environmental protection may require
some kind of rationing or queueing. If the people are purely notional—far removed
geographically, or not yet born (as in Malthus’s famous image of the intruders at Nature’s
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Feast)—the intuitive answer would probably be no, although sorting through the implications of that position leads rapidly to an ethical morass. I return to the issue of “excludability” in the discussion of governance below.
But do such calculations apply across national borders or only within them? The
question arises in considering whether countries are responsible for their population
growth—or, more precisely, for their natural increase. UN conventions would seem to
assume not: they assign a proliferating number of rights to individuals, often at the
expense of “rights of society,” with population growth (or decline) one outcome of the
exercise of those rights. Rawls, the theorist of justice, might have been expected to
agree, but in fact does not. He writes: “An important role of a people’s government,
however arbitrary a society’s boundaries may appear from a historical point of view, is
to be the representative and effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for
their territory and its environmental integrity, as well as for the size of their population”
(Rawls 1999: 39). The territory—and its capacity to support its population in perpetuity—is construed as an asset; the agent responsible for the maintenance of that asset is
“the people themselves as politically organized.” The people must “recognize that they
cannot make up for their irresponsibility in caring for their land and its natural resources
by conquest in war or by migrating into other people’s territory without their consent”
(ibid.).12
In the P–E context, human ethics must at some point be reconciled with environmental ethics. Demographers, hardly surprisingly, are anthropocentrists, as are nearly
all social scientists. Anthropocentrists can be resolute environmentalists, strongly committed to ecological stability and willing perhaps to trade off appreciable human welfare
to protect endangered species or sustain fragile ecosystems. These are plausible emphases in an individual’s welfare function and can constitute a coherent “light green” ethical position. Under “deep-green” environmental ethics, P–E systems become simply Esystems.
Human history has seen a gradual expansion of the “moral community” to include all humans, in theory if not fully in practice. But that expansion halts at the species
boundary. In welfare calculations, even grouping humans with other primates, a modest
ethical extension and one fairly easily defended, would strike most practitioners as a far-
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fetched exercise.13 Attribution of a right to moral consideration to members of more
distant species (a classic query in the environmental ethics literature is “Should trees
have standing?”) is still further removed from ordinary environmental politics and its
ethical premises.
D ESIGN OF G OVERNING I NSTITUTIONS FOR P–E S YSTEMS
Management of environmental systems (E-systems) can draw on a body of accumulated experience recorded in the large conservationist literature. Except for commonpool resource systems, however, P–E systems have been less thoroughly explored. Findings for the most part are scattered in the literatures of human ecology, social anthropology,
political science, and social and environmental history. The exception is important, but
the special nature of CPR systems needs to be kept in mind: the principles of CPR
management are not necessarily helpful in broader P–E contexts. At the other extreme
of generality, work on what may eventually become a generic theory of institutional
design offers some overall guidelines but is of little value on specific design issues.14
CPR system governance
Ostrom’s major study of CPR systems looks at documented instances of longlasting systems, such as livestock management in Swiss alpine villages. From these
cases she distills the following conditions for effective governance (Ostrom 1990: 90):
• Clearly defined resource boundaries and participants
• Rules for resource use appropriate for local conditions
• Participant involvement in rule-making
• Participant involvement in monitoring
• Graduated sanctions for rule violation; participant involvement in sanctioning
• Local, low-cost mediation to resolve conflicts
• Relative autonomy of CPR institutional arrangements from government interference
In addition, where there is a hierarchy of systems, the rules at each level must be
compatible.

14

Most actual CPR systems depart from such conditions—as they do from abstract
models of iterated n-person, positive-sum games. They tend to be fragile and prone to
breakdown. Monitoring may be onerous and enforcement difficult. Participants have
incomplete information about the system and differing stakes in its preservation—and
differing incentives for defection. “Participant involvement” may be little more than
nominal, especially when numbers are large. Indeed, many systems that are potential
candidates for CPR-type governance may never be able to set it up: among Ostrom’s
examples is the case of the Kirindi Oya irrigation system in Sri Lanka, “where no one
cooperated with anyone else, and all lived in a hydrologic nightmare” (p. 214).
Formally, the oceans and the atmosphere are potential CPR systems, but with
states rather than individuals as participants. States are acknowledged as equal sovereign entities in the rule-making process. However, that implies a radical inequality of
representation in per capita terms and belies any direct analogue to small CPRs (see
McNicoll 1999). The cases are better treated as general P–E systems.
General P–E system governance
Most P–E systems do not show the symmetry among participants needed for
CPR governance, with its prospect of positive-sum strategies through cooperative action. More common are systems containing unilateral transfers—where environmental
exploitation yields gains to some participants but is accompanied by a shedding of costs
to others. Favorable environmental outcomes might then require paying off the losers.
In addition to working out such compensation arrangements, major governance issues
include devising a satisfactory compliance regime and adapting to changes in supervening conditions—not least, dealing with population change.
Transfers and compensation.

In a private property regime, the allocation of gains

among system participants is largely determined by the distribution of ownership and
access rights. Historical inequities in the establishment of those rights can often be pointed
to but are rarely a factor in that allocation. The main governance task is ensuring containment of negative spillovers, whether among participants or to outsiders. Where a
commons is involved, there is a prior problem of devising and supervising the allocation
rules on exploitation—frequently a highly intricate and politically laden task. A further
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governance concern may be that of trying to prevent shirking of responsibilities for
system maintenance.
Many P–E systems are socially underbounded. They reward their participants
while transferring some of the costs of environmental exploitation to others. In effect, in
terms of the earlier discussion of boundaries, the system is construed as if it contained
only P2. Those excluded may be in a different country or be members of a politically
marginalized class or ethnic group or simply be too few to be politically significant.
Where the number of potential claimants is large, the harm to each may be comparatively slight, making it difficult to organize them to assert the claim—a familiar impediment to collective action (Olson 1965) and one that in the P–E case routinely results in
heavy aesthetic losses. Hence it is entirely possible for a P–E system apparently to yield
a sustainable environmental outcome together with satisfied immediate beneficiaries,
whereas the level of satisfaction would be judged very differently if all the participants
in the properly bounded system were included.
River systems often exemplify such a situation, with downstream users having
limited recourse against changing upstream use. One community’s levees for flood control shift the flood risk to other communities. Despite their formal position as a supervening authority, national political systems are poorly organized to preclude such cost
shedding or to compensate for it. Economic development inevitably brings an uneven
incidence of gains and losses across regions—a byproduct of policies that deal with
citizens by characteristics other than location—and this would simply be seen as another such case, not specific enough for government economic redress or for tort action
by the victims. Moreover, within a state there is often little the downstream propertyholders or communities can bargain with or threaten. Remedy is more likely in situations where international borders are involved, where the claimants are already mobilized as sovereign states and can draw on the precedents and options of international
relations. Over the next decade or two, for example, the Euphrates and Tigris waters
available to Syria and Iraq will be much diminished by the completion of Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project, a vast irrigation and hydropower scheme. India’s construction
of the Farakka Barrage, diverting Ganges water toward Calcutta, diminishes the lowseason flow to Bangladesh. Future upstream damming of the Nile will restrict Egypt’s

16

irrigation. The treaties arrived at for sharing the resource in such cases can draw on the
limited amount of international law on the subject but in the main reflect the geographic
advantage of the upper riparian state and the relative economic (and, in the background,
military) power of the parties.
Changes in atmospheric composition through chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) or greenhouse gas emissions are global P–E systems with significant unilateral transfers. Negotiations among the industrialized states to restrict emissions proceeded as if the problems were those of CPR governance (the resource in each case being the atmosphere as
sink), but when they encompassed the developing countries as well, the asymmetries
had to be dealt with. In the CFC case, the G-77 bloc—essentially, the developing countries—was initially unwilling to assent to the draft Montreal Protocol; success came
only when India, as the leading G-77 member, was persuaded, which “was attained
through a process which framed ozone protection as a North–South conflict, not a commons dilemma” (see Herring 1999: 220). The modified agreement incorporated both
technology sharing and some direct compensation for transition costs. In the greenhouse case, the international transfers that have to be anticipated in a carbon-trading
governance regime, already large among the developed-country signatories to the Kyoto
Protocol, would be potentially much larger still with inclusion of the developing countries—some of them soon to be among the biggest CO2 emitters.
Compliance and sanctions.

In small CPR systems, compliance with the rules of

participation can often be ensured by a combination of internalized behavioral norms
and informal social pressures—with the sanctions of social ostracism or exclusion typically available as backup. In larger and less symmetrical systems, the rules are necessarily more complex and the procedures for ensuring compliance have to be more formal,
though these may supplement rather than replace the informal procedures.
Pettit (1996: 72–87) distinguishes two general approaches to compliance, which
he terms deviant-centered strategies and complier-centered strategies. A deviant-centered strategy is that of deterrence, one that seeks to impose a sanction on a noncomplier
sufficient to cause regret to the offender. It has two problems, Pettit argues: the power
necessarily given to whoever oversees the sanctioning process, and the tendency it has
to force all agents into “egocentric deliberation”—a calculating mode in which they
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examine their own best interests in deciding whether or not to comply rather than acting
on principle, which most would otherwise be inclined to do. A complier-centered strategy, in contrast, is concerned to reinforce the actions of agents who tend for the most
part not to act in an egocentric way. The latter can be accomplished partly by screening
out the most likely noncompliers and partly by choosing sanctions that promote
nonegocentric deliberation—for example, by use of “shaming,” as in the practice of
reprobative justice.
Most large P–E systems rely on the first of these approaches. Explicit treaty provisions are likely to be involved, and elaborate quasi-legal compliance systems are inescapable. Where it is feasible, however, the second approach would be less costly—
perhaps progressively so—and probably less onerous. An efficient option may be to
combine the two, restricting formal sanctioning to a small residue of recalcitrants.15
International P–E systems where the participants are states illustrate the problems of designing compliance regimes. In the strict sense the international sphere is
anarchic but certainly not ruleless or unordered. Compliance in a system may be enforced by prescribed treaty sanction or by unilateral action by an important player. But
equally, it may be voluntary, as befitting a good international citizen; or it may be sustained by social pressure from the “international community” or by fear of notoriety.
Institutional arrangements regulating behavior do not necessarily require a supervening
organization: those arrangements themselves constitute a regime and may be sufficiently
entrenched to be self-enforcing or nearly so.16
Consider the compliance problems of the Kyoto Protocol. Under the protocol,
each country is required to provide an “annual inventory of anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases,” and enough supplementary information “necessary to demonstrate compliance.” There is provision for “expert review
teams” under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties or its secretariat to assess
these reports, and there are (as yet unspecified) penalties for noncompliance. (See Grubb
et al. 1999.) All this is clearly deviant-centered. But alongside that apparatus, it is certain that there will be an array of NGOs and IGOs (Greenpeace, or AOSIS [Association
of Small Island States], for example) engaged in identifying and shaming treaty violators. We already see the influence of such organizations in publicizing departures or
apparent departures from environmental good behavior—and their effect on both pri-
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vate-sector and government actors. Increasingly, such organizations are being given (or
assume) roles in regime design negotiations and in official monitoring.17
Compliance issues that might entail penalizing or rewarding population change
are especially sensitive, reflecting the status of that subject in the international discourse
on human rights. The same organizations that routinely hold governments to account on
environmental matters largely avoid any suggestion that demography might warrant
similar attention. The reluctance of the 1992 Earth Summit to deal with population matters and the dispensing with any mention of demographic targets in the 1994 Cairo
Program of Action were notable cases in point.
Population growth and excludability. Governance of a P–E system requires a
determinate population and hence rules for inclusion as a participant. Sustainable exploitation of a renewable resource cannot be achieved under open access. If participant
numbers are allowed to rise, per capita yields must be correspondingly reduced; there is
thus a strong incentive for existing participants to exclude newcomers. Inmigrants to a
community often do not automatically acquire environmental access. Some traditional
communities not only accord greater resource rights to original settlers than to later
migrants, but also apply that same distinction even to distant descendants of the two
groups. Within states, the practice of recognition of citizenship by birth and liberal rules
on the incorporation of new entrants may be at odds with, and give way to, ethnic or
cultural solidarity asserting a supposedly prior claim to resource access.
In a loose sense, a nation-state is itself a P–E system—the P its total population,
the E its terrestrial and coastal marine natural environment. Population growth dilutes
access rights and, without stringent rules on exploitation, may harm environmental conditions. A state has virtually complete authority over immigration but has little regulatory power over the highly decentralized processes of natural increase. Most states with
high fertility have sought to extend the practice of birth control, but through mild and
voluntaristic measures nominally aimed at meeting an existing demand by families.
They tolerate congestion effects on environmental amenity or dilution of per capita resource supplies as preferable to the political and human costs of rigorous control. China
and Vietnam have been the principal exceptions—both seeking to cap family size, albeit
with a broad developmental rationale rather than out of concern for environmental
sustainability. At smaller social scales, community control of fertility (or equivalently,
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of marriage or household establishment) is more common, at least historically: numerous such practices existed in preindustrial Europe, Japan, and probably China (see
McNicoll 1975; Lee and Wang 1999).
At the international level, in P–E systems with nation-states as participants, differential population growth might be supposed to be an important issue in regime design. Over the next several decades some countries anticipate another population doubling or more; others will begin to experience significant declines in numbers. In practice,
however, allocative decisions concerning access rights to the few remaining global commons have thus far been made with scant interest in existing population relativities, let
alone in anticipated changes in relativities.18 Neither counted for much in the Law of the
Sea negotiations. In current discussions on carbon emission targets to control the greenhouse effect, per capita equity across states has not been a major concern, though it may
yet become a consideration.
P ROSPECTS FOR P OPULATION –E NVIRONMENT S YSTEM
M ANAGEMENT
Management of a population–environment system is a kind of holding action in
an already transformed environment, pursuing the gains from exploitation of that environment while limiting (further) “adverse” changes in it—and perhaps even achieving
some degree of repair. The management task is made more difficult if there are unclear
or contested boundaries, large numbers of participants, complex system dynamics and
outcome indicators, or unequal stakes by participants. The more important systems usually have just those qualities.
Management success from an environmental standpoint is judged in terms of
sustainability. This is not a clear-cut concept, often lacking any specification of what is
to be sustained.19 Further difficulties in judging outcomes arise from the fact that P–E
systems are never fully autonomous, even in physical terms. One overlaps another, sharing components; smaller systems are parts of larger ones. Knowledge of a system’s
dynamics can never be complete, and each is subject to changes originating beyond the
control of its human participants, and partly or wholly unanticipated. A sustainable outcome calls for agility in management response on continually shifting ground.
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This is also true of environmental systems alone, where the objective is to protect
part of the natural world from degradation. Thus, for example, forest ecosystems, however competently managed, will be transformed by atmospheric warming; the accidental spread of organisms and species across widely distant regions, an inevitable consequence of human activity, can destroy unique regional biota; a massive collective effort may
slow the growth of anthropogenic carbon emissions, but it does nothing about natural sources
of climate change. Active human intervention is often required to preserve “naturalness.”
P–E system outcomes are subject not only to changes in surrounding ecological
conditions but also to changes in their institutional context. Any governance regime
relies on established patterns and expectations concerning social relationships: respect
for contractual understandings, the backing of a legal order or its equivalent in customary law, and the inadmissibility of force in dispute resolution. If that stability breaks
down, the system is likely to fail, both socially and environmentally.
Population growth is one evident threat to that stability. Generational doublings
in population size, a familiar modern phenomenon, put a large stress on institutional
arrangements for capping resource exploitation at sustainable levels. The gains to a
system’s participants may be heavily diluted, undermining its rationale; the numbers of
would-be participants at the boundaries increase, challenging its restriction on access
rights; the likelihood of system failure is increased. Such a threat is of course alleviated
to the extent that capital investment and technological advances generate sufficient expansion in non–resource-intensive sectors of the economy, drawing labor into new industries and the population into new kinds of consumption—including, typically, the
“consumption” and thus the protection of environmental amenity.
The course of modern demographic transition has seen a worldwide surge in population growth caused by economic and public health achievement, followed by successive country declines in growth as lower fertility takes hold. In many cases, the population surge has been accompanied by extensive environmental degradation—albeit through
ignorance as much as through institutional malfunction. As affluence and environmental sensibilities increase, an effort may be made to remedy the damage.
For the world as a whole, population decline is still a distant prospect. The UN
medium-variant trajectory, in the 1998 projections, reaches more than 10 billion in two
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centuries, although it is already at 9 billion by 2050. (Some other analysts expect the
peak to be closer to 8 billion, and attained this century.) What is the likely scenario for
the global P–E system, where E is the planetary environment as a whole? We cannot yet
know whether the peak global population and the disruptive technologies it employs in
the path to postindustrial, aged, and perhaps environmentally benign affluence will leave
a permanently impoverished natural world or one that can in large measure repair itself.
Indeed, we cannot even say much about the likely future quality of the built environment—the immediate surroundings of most of humanity.
“Planetary management” is the title of a concluding section in Smil’s Global
Ecology (1993), but Smil sees little hope in such a thing.20 Global environmental problems, perhaps fortunately, lack a global Hobbesian Leviathan to sort them out. Smil
points to the “design and implementation perils of grand schemes and massive bureaucracies” (p. 211)—a theme taken up in a different context by Scott (1998). Smil’s preferred way ahead is through country-specific actions, taken in the interests of each country
itself (though not of course at the expense of others)—actions that have their own rewards and are not necessarily dependent on the validity of current knowledge of environmental systems, let alone notional values of yet-to-be-discovered environmental goods
and services.
But there are global problems likely to require a concerted response. For that
task, what we have, organizationally, is the society of states, together with international
institutions like the UN whose constituents are states, and a more diffuse “international
community” of NGOs, IGOs, and other bodies that in combination are sometimes referred to as global civil society. The society of states confronting a global commons is in
some respects a scaled-up analogue of a local community seeking to deal with a depleted aquifer or fishery without recourse to government. The major difference, of course,
is that states as actors, assigned nominal equality as sovereign entities, disguise radically diverse population sizes. Hence there are always two (at least) equity claims in
play: that of equality of state sovereignty and that of equality of human rights. Both
claims would often be dominated by a third: that conferred by the economic or military
power of states, in isolation or alliance.
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Notes
Revised version of a paper prepared for the Seminar on Methods of Population–
Environment Analysis, Penang, 10–11 April 2000, organized by the Asian
MetaCentre for Population and Sustainable Development Analysis and the International Centre for Living Aquatic Resource Management (ICLARM). Comments
by Adrian Hayes are acknowledged.
1

Intentionality may have been present at a lower systemic level. Thus in Australian prehistory, nomadic groups used forest burning to create grasslands that would
attract game. The unintended higher-level systemic outcome, it is argued, was
the spread of fire-resistant tree species and, more speculatively—through a series
of related effects—a drying of weather patterns. (See Flannery 1994.)

2

The “critical environmental zones” identified by Kasperson et al. (1995)—regions with seriously endangered ecologies resulting from human activities—are
all delimited in terms of geographic ecosystem boundaries, and their degradation
often can be tied to the political difficulty of constructing an appropriate administrative authority. The nine regions in this study are: Amazonia; Eastern Sundaland
(Java, Sumatra, Peninsular Malaysia, and Kalimantan); the Ukambani of eastern
Kenya; the settled uplands of Nepal; the Ordos Plateau of Inner Mongolia; the
Aral Sea basin; the Southern High Plains and Ogallala aquifer in northwestern
Texas; the Basin of Mexico (surrounding Mexico City); and the North Sea.

3

Singer’s hierarchy of species in descending order of moral considerability is based
on assessments of relative neural complexity. But it maps poorly onto the hierarchy of species accorded actual protection from hunting or consumption as food
in most human cultures. (See Singer 1990.)

4

The Chernobyl case is formally analogous. The airshed that was subject to radioactive contamination in 1986 covered a large populated region beyond Ukraine.
The governments representing this cross-border P3 population have agreed to
contribute to the costs of closing the Chernobyl plant.

5

CO2 emissions are assessed by the equivalent forest area required for sequestration.
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6

For six West African countries, Leach and Fairhead cite the World Conservation
Monitoring Centre as estimating an area of 48 million hectares lost to forest over
the twentieth century; their own estimate of the loss, based on a more realistic
calculation of the baseline, is some 10 million hectares. They challenge both the
depiction of a “natural” undisturbed forest before the modern era of rapid population growth and the view that farming and settlement can only damage forests.

7

Unless such migration exacerbates environmental decline—as, for instance, in
the case of the once-spectacular Ifugao rice terraces of Luzon, decaying from
lack of maintenance.

8

See, for example, Murray-Darling Basin Commission (1999). (The Murray-Darling river basin, subject to severe irrigation-related salination, extends over an
area of 100 million hectares in eastern Australia.)

9

This principle, as it appears in the 1992 Rio Declaration (Principle 15), reads:
“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.”

10

Economists’ treatment of depreciation is analogous. A constant time-rate of depreciation is usually preferred to setting a fixed lifetime of an investment—the
so-called one-hoss shay assumption.

11

Cf. Alfred Marshall (1890: ch. 13, para. 3 fn): “The Englishman [J.S.] Mill bursts
into unwonted enthusiasm when speaking [in his discussion of the stationary
state] of the pleasures of wandering alone in beautiful scenery: American economists from Carey to Henry George no less characteristically use their highest
eloquence in splendid descriptions of the growing richness of human life as the
backwoodsman finds neighbours settling around him, as the backwoods settlement develops into a village, the village into a town, and the town into a vast
city.”

12

Rawls somewhat casually dismisses concerns about the highly unequal per capita
distribution of natural resources by remarking that “the crucial element in how a
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country fares is its political culture—its members’ political and civic virtues—
and not the level of its resources, [hence] the arbitrariness of the distribution of
natural resources causes no difficulty” (Rawls 1999: 117).
13

That, however, is the agenda of the ethically well-grounded Great Ape Project.
See www.greatapeproject.org.

14

See Goodin (1996a: 39–43). Goodin’s tentative principles of institutional design
call for revisability (within limits), robustness (to changing circumstances, within
limits), sensitivity to motivational complexity (including “designing institutions
for knaves”), public defensibility, and variability (to allow learning by doing and
experimentation).

15

Cost-effectiveness is not the only basis for choice of compliance strategy—or a
governance regime in general. Dryzek (1996) argues that market-based responses
to environmental problems—pollution charges, emissions trading, etc.—although
seen by economists as generally preferable in efficiency to regulatory measures,
are objected to by many environmentalists precisely because they fail to stigmatize the behavior. Pollution is not made to seem morally wrong.

16

See Young (1989: 37–44). International organizations increasingly seek to add
that formal supervention in specific functional areas.

17

The CITES treaty (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species) is
administered by international NGOs—the IUCN and WWF—agencies that have
no formal policing authority but that can monitor species conditions, publicize
emerging crises, and direct opprobrium at offending states.

18

During its brief period of Emergency rule in the 1970s, India’s government sought
to end population-based adjustments to the allocation formula for federal grants
to the states, thereby penalizing high-fertility states.

19

See the essays in Dobson (1999) for some contrasting views. An interpretation in
terms of maintenance of “natural capital” merely adds another definitional problem.
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“The grandest of these co-operative approaches” would be a global compact be-
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tween rich and poor countries, trading off “a drastic reduction of energy and
material use in the rich countries in return for the commitment to an early achievement of replacement fertilities in the poor world”—a scheme proposed by John
Holdren (Smil 1993: 208).
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